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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As California enters the 21st Century, its public schools face many challenges. One 
significant challenge is the serious disrepair of an aging school facility infrastructure. 
Another challenge is the anticipated growth of nearly 2 million K-12 students during the 
next decade that will require many districts to build new schools to meet burgeoning 
student demand. Recognizing the substantial need for infrastructure, in November 1998, 
California voters passed Proposition 1A, a bond measure that provides $6.7 billion for 
public K-12 school construction and repair. 
This measure establishes two new programs for the disbursement ofbond funds and 
simplifies the application process by which schools apply for school construction 
resources. This change in programs. and in the methods by which fiinds are allocated, is 
important to the people of the State, as school districts, many of which have facilities in 
serious disrepair or require new construction, vie for their portion of the $6.7 billion pie. 
Historically, the process by which schools applied for and received construction funds was 
cumbersome and complex. Furthermore, the research suggests that school districts that 
were sophisticated and knowledgeable about the complicated school facilities construction 
process were the most successful in securing funding - often at the expense of less 
sophisticated and uninformed school districts. Proposition 1 A corrects much of this 
dynamic by simplifying the application and administrative processes, thereby creating a 
more level playing field for all school districts. 
In order to understand the significance and relevance of this new process and its 
concomitant programs, however, it is useful to review the history of school construction 
financing in California and to understand the various pitfalls that existed under previous 
programs so as to avoid similar pitfalls in the future. This paper discusses that history and 
highlights the problems with preexisting programs. 
It begins with an examination of the State Allocation Board and its staff (the Office of 
Public School Construction). Specifically, it reviews the role of the Board which is 
responsible for establishing policies for the distribution of school facility financing funds. 
It discusses how the Board, which was established in 1947, has evolved during the past 
five decades from one that set policy for various loan programs to one that today sets 
policy for grant programs. 
The paper also discusses how various externalities-legislative or voter imposed 
initiatives, such as Proposition 13-have affected the Board's policies and procedures. 
The paper notes that the Board changed its policies often, and its policy shifts created an 
untenable dynamic for school districts as they attempted to secure funding. In particular, 
the paper highlights how districts were forced to weave their way through a complex, 
bureaucratic maze of applications, forms, and plans; and how this dynamic forced school 
districts to employ sophisticated personnel, or to contract with savvy consultants, in order 
to secure state financing for their construction projects. 
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This paper also presents a history of bond initiatives during the past five decades. It is 
clear that throughout this history there was never enough State money available to school 
districts for facility construction or repair. In fact, in spite of the $6.7 billion approved by 
Proposition 1A, experts estimate that an additional $10 billion will be required during the 
next decade. This paper discusses how the constant shortage of funds caused districts to 
use "whatever" means available to them to secure funding. 
Voters have consistently been generous in approving the vast majority of statewide bond 
initiatives. Only three bond proposals out of 24 have failed in the past 50 years, and those 
that failed did so during times of recession. However, it is not clear how much additional 
debt voters will be willing to incur. This has especially been true since the passage of 
Proposition 13 in 1978, when the State began taking on a larger role in supporting school 
eonstruetien then it httd before. To tl:tat end, trns paper discuss@& how Proposition 1 A 
creates a mechanism for school districts to tap state resources, and how school districts 
may need to tap other sources of facility funding. 
Proposition 1 A forges a partnership between the State and school districts for financing 
the construction and repair of their schools. Under its new programs, the State will 
provide 50 percent of the cost associated with building new schools, and provide 80 
percent of the cost associated with modernizing existing facilities. It requires school 
districts to match state resources. However, school districts that are unable to offer this 
match can receive hardship funds based on prescriptive criteria. This paper provides 
details regarding these new programs and compares them to programs previously 
administered by the State Allocation Board. It also discusses how the Board is required to 
respond to district requests. 
Proposition 1A is not the only impetus behind simplifying the school facility financing 
process. Concurrently, the Office ofPublic School Construction has rewritten the 
application process for funds to make it more user-friendly to school districts and has even 
offered applications and program information via the Internet. This paper discusses these 
changes. 
The paper concludes with options that the Governor and the Legislature may wish to 
consider, including: offering protection to small and rural school districts when bond funds 
are exhausted; requiring annual financial reporting by the State Allocation Board; 
providing an on-line technical support for program applicants; and redeveloping the State 
funding source for school facility construction and rehabilitation. 
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REQUEST FOR RESEARCH 
Programs and administrative procedures in Proposition lA may produce significant 
changes to the previous programs and the manner by which the State Allocation Board 
distributes resources for school facility construction. In light of these changes, Senator 
Quentin Kopp requested that the California Research Bureau provide research on the 
following topics: 
• A history of the State Allocation Board. How was the board's funding 
program intended to work and how has it evolved? 
• An explanation of the State Allocation Board process. How does the State 
Allocation Board work? What are the procedures and criteria for receiving 
allocations? How are priorities set? 
INTRODUCTION-THE PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION lA 
On November 3, 1998, California voters passed Proposition lA- a $9.2 billion school 
bond initiative, and the largest of its kind passed in our nation's history. Over the next 
four years, revenues from Proposition lA' s general obligation bonds will provide $6.7 
billion to public K-12 schools and $2.5 billion to public colleges and universities for the 
purposes of constructing new facilities and repairing existing ones. 
The State Allocation Board will have the responsibility for determining a fair means of 
distributing the $6.7 billion available to K-12 schools. Many experts feel that developing 
such a system will be a daunting task, in spite of the fact that Proposition !A/Senate Bill 
50 is very prescriptive regarding the allocation of its bond funds. 
This paper begins with a history and a discussion of the role of the State Allocation Board. 
Next, it examines the 24 state bond initiatives since 1947 and discusses how the Board has 
evolved its policies for distributing resources generated by these bond efforts. It then 
presents an overview of Proposition lA and how this initiative creates a new allocation 
program that differs from previous ones. The paper also discusses the various problems 
that existed within the State Allocation Board's previous resource allocation systems and 
how Proposition IA addresses these problems. It concludes with a section that offers 
options that the Legislature may wish to consider regarding the policies that the State 
Allocation Board should use for the equitable distribution of bond funds. 
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HISTORY OF THE STATE ALLOCATION BOARD AND ITS ROLE 
IN SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCING 
There is a long and complex history regarding public school construction in California. 
This paper begins a review of the history in 19471 when the state legislature created the 
State Allocation Board.2 Chapter 243, Statutes of 1947, established the State Allocation 
Board3 as a successor to the Post War Public Works Review Board. That statute 
specifically authorized the board to allocate funds for building and repairing schools. In 
addition, it designated the State Allocation Board to make allocations for public works 
projects when no other state officer or agency had authority to appropriate state or federal 
funds. 4 Although it had many other fund allocation requirements during its five-decade 
history, the State Allocation Board today allocates funds only for school construction and 
renovation. 
Composition of the Board 
The State Allocation Board is comprised of seven members: two Senate members 
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee; two Assembly members appointed by the 
Speaker of the Assembly; the Director of the Department of General Services or his/her 
designee; the Director of the Department of Finance or his/her designee; and the 
Superintendent ofPublic Instruction or his/her designee. This appointment structure has 
existed since the Board's inception in 1947.5 
Although its basic appointment structure is set in statute, its actual membership changes 
over time. One member, Senator Leroy Greene, served on the Board for over 20 years. 
Some Board members have served for only one meeting, while others have served an 
entire legislative session. 
The four legislatively appointed State Allocation Board members provide a strong policy 
influence to the State Allocation Board. Through them, other members of the Legislature 
have input into the Board's policy and decision-making processes. 
Policy Requirements 
Members of the State Allocation Board are charged to formulate fair systems for 
determining priorities among project proposals. Prior to the passage of Proposition 
IA/SB 50 in 1998, the Board was responsible for developing a fair and equitable appeals 
process that addressed the "special needs" of school districts. Such "special needs" 
included disaster relief, inability to secure matching funds, or inability to locate affordable 
property. 
Board members also had extraordinary power to set school facility financing policy. 
Although the Board falls under the auspices of the State Administrative Procedures Act, it 
has often ignored the Act's provisions. It was common that board policies were changed 
from meeting to meeting, and that these new policies were not readily made public. 6 
Therefore, school districts that were uninformed of existing policy operated at a distinct 
disadvantage. They may not have known the appropriate procedures for receiving 
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financing approval. Conversely, school districts that utilized hired consultants or had staff 
that regularly monitored the Board's actions knew exactly what mechanisms and 
procedures would be necessary for them to secure funding. 
State Allocation Board Staff 
The Office ofPublic School Construction (formerly the Office of Local Assistance), within 
the Department of General Services, was and continues to be responsible for providing 
staff work that is necessary to carry out the policies and implement the various programs 
of the State Allocation Board. The State Allocation Board is responsible for policies 
regarding the allocation of funds for building new schools and for repairing, upgrading, 
and rehabilitating old ones. 
The Office of Public School Construction staff is also responsible for disseminating to 
school districts information regarding board policy and programs. Under its previous 
programs, the staff was responsible for making recommendations to the State Allocation 
Board regarding various appeals made by school districts that may have been denied 
funding, or that may have required special funding consideration. To that end, the Office 
of Public School Construction staff influenced where school districts fell on the long 
queue of project proposals considered and passed by the State Allocation Board. Staff 
also could have influenced Board decisions by advocating for specific school district 
projects. 
Outside Influence 
The State Allocation Board and the Office ofPublic School Construction staff have also 
been influenced by a variety of external interest groups. These include, but are not limited 
to, private school facility financing consultants, school board members, school 
administrators, teachers, parents, developers, California Building Industry Association, 
financial institutions, and other members of the Legislature. In addition, various state 
agencies with influence included the Division of State Architect, Department ofFinance, 
and the Department of Education. These interests groups played and are likely to play a 
significant role in determining funding for projects that may have been denied or required 
special consideration. Consultants in particular, whether employed by or on contract with 
school districts, played an active role in the process. Many of these consultants, whose 
offices are in the same building as that of the Office ofPublic School Construction, 
influenced decisions of both the Office ofPublic School Construction staff and the State 
Allocation Board. Consultants were current on Board policies and procedures, and were 
highly sophisticated about the complicated processes that school districts must follow in 
order to obtain funding. They have been instrumental in shepherding proposals through 
the complex maze of funding phases- application to construction. School districts that 
did not contract with such advocates were often at a competitive disadvantage. 
Evolution of State Allocation Board Programs-From Loans to Grants 
The State Allocation Board has evolved markedly during the past five decades. Initially, 
its school programs provided resources to school districts via loan programs in which 
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districts were required to repay their assistance with property tax revenues. In addition, 
school districts used local school bonds to finance their various construction projects. In 
both cases, a two-thirds popular vote was required. 
Proposition 13 
With the passage ofProposition 13 in 1978, the State Allocation Board's loan orientation 
was significantly altered. Under Proposition 13, the amount of tax that property owners 
paid was limited to no more than one percent of the assessed value of their property. 
Local property tax revenues diminished, and the burden to fund many local government 
programs was shifted to the State, including public school construction. Further, local 
governments lost much of their property taxing authority, and the Legislature and 
Governor were forced to rethink how school districts could re a their existin loans to 
t e State Allocation Board. 
Recognizing that many school districts faced bankruptcy by being unable to service their 
loans, the Legislature in 1979 directed the State Allocation Board to allow school districts 
four options: (1) withhold payments on their loans; (2) temporarily delay their payments; 
(3) pay only a portion of their loan obligations; (4) or not pay back their loans at all. 
Further, with the implementation of these options, the Legislature required that the State 
Allocation Board shift its policy focus from a loan-based program to a grant-based 
program. This shift to grant-based programs remains today. 
California Research Bureau, California State Library 7 
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HISTORY OF SCHOOL BOND INITIATIVES-A CYCLE OF 
UNDER-FUNDING 
The electorate of the state has been ultimately responsible for determining the availability 
of resources for school construction. The electorate must have confidence in the state's 
economy, and perceive a need for new and upgraded schools. Without such as~urances, 
the electorate can and has rejected various bond efforts. Since 1949, voters have been 
asked to approve 24 bond measures related to school construction and renovation, and 
have passed 21 ofthese proposals. However, an interesting history follows regarding the 
content of these initiatives. 
State as a Bank-The Loan Program 1949-1978 
Legislation enacted in 19497 and 19528 established a loan-grant program "to aid school 
districts of the State in providing necessary and adequate school sites and buildings for the 
pupils of the public school system."9 During this time period, the first baby boomers 
entered school, and for the next two decades, California public school enrollment 
increased by roughly 300 percent.10 The Legislature recognized that many school districts 
faced substantial enrollment growth, while lacking the bond debt capacity that was 
necessary to finance large building programs. In fact, many school districts had reached 
their financial capacity to service the bonds that they previously incurred. 
As a result, the Legislature developed a program to provide loans to school districts that 
were approaching or were likely to exceed their legal level of bonded indebtedness. 11 This 
new program was financed through State general obligation bonds. This program also 
required building construction standards and placed fiscal controls on the districts, 
including maximum cost standards and square feet per pupil limitations. 12 School districts, 
however, retained control over the design and construction of their facilities. Districts that 
wanted to participate in the state loan program were required to receive approval from 
two-thirds of their district's electorate in order to incur the debt. A surcharge on the local 
property tax provided revenues to service the loan debt. 
The State formula provided that the total amount due on some loans would be less than 
the total amount of the actual loan. Some experts believe that the state's willingness to 
forgive part of school district loans through this formula was a precursor to the state grant 
program discussed below. 
The First Loan Program Bond Initiatives 
In 1949, the state issued its first bond proposal for education facilities financing13 in the 
amount of$250 million.14 This first initiative also began a cycle of inadequate funding. In 
that year, the Legislature thought that $400 million was necessary (over what school 
districts could afford above their debt limits) to meet the need of school districts that were 
facing enrollment growth from the new generation of baby boomers. However, after 
substantial debate, the bond proposal was reduced to $250 million, because the sponsors 
thought, "the people would not vote for such a large sum at one time."15 In arguments 
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against the bond, opponents argued that $250 million was insufficient. Therefore, absent 
full funding, voters should reject the initiative. The measure passed. 
In 1952, another school construction bond of$185 million was put before the voters. 
Proponents of this initiative stated that the amount was "extremely" conservative. A 
comprehensive study by the State Department ofEducation at that time revealed that 
$198 million was needed, while the Department of Finance estimated the need at $250 
million. Again, the amount of needed resources surpassed the amount proposed, and the 
cycle of chronically under-funded facility financing for schools continued. 
To further exacerbate the shortfall, the 1952 proposition, along with subsequent 
propositions offered in 1956, 1958, and 1960, included "poison pill" language that limited 
the Legislature's ability to appt opt iate any additional fuflds for seaool construction beyond 
that in the various propositions.16 If the Legislature approved any additional resources for 
school construction, the amount of bonds that were sold would be reduced by an amount 
equal to the additional appropriation. After 1960, however, bond proposals excluded the 
language that precluded the Legislature from raising additional capital outlay funds. 
During a two-decade period, the State Allocation Board administered this program as a 
bank. Resources from the state were limited, and many school districts were 
uncomfortable with the concept of borrowing money from the state, rather than from their 
local constituents. Further, since school districts were obligated to reach full bond 
indebtedness before applying for state loans, many did not participate. For these reasons, 
many school districts chose not to build facilities until their bonding capacity grew. 
Hence, many school districts found themselves chasing dollars after their schools were 
overcrowded-a situation not unlike today. 
The Early 1970s 
As a result of a major earthquake in the San Fernando Valley (Sylmar) in 1971, the state 
authorized $30 million17 for a new program to finance the rehabilitation and construction 
of earthquake safe schools, 18 and for the renovation of buildings that the earthquake 
damaged. 19 This program was known as the School Buildings Safety Fund. Like its 
predecessor programs, the 1971 Act created a state loan program for eligible school 
districts. The Act also included provisions to forgive loans for school districts that had 
reached their bonding capacity. The 1971 program was augmented by a 1972 state bond 
initiative of$350 million of which $250 million was set aside for structural repairs due to 
earthquakes. 20 This latter bond initiative also provided a method for financing buildings in 
districts that did not meet the criteria of the program that was initiated in 1971,21 and it 
required the State Allocation Board to first approve those applications from school 
districts for earthquake repairs. The State Allocation Board gave second consideration to 
funding projects for other types of repairs or upgrades. Hence, the Board began a new 
system for not only new construction but also repairs, as well as a system that set 
priorities. 
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A Changing Paradigm 
From 1970 to 1980, public school enrollment statewide decreased by roughly one percent 
per year?2 Reductions in both immigration and domestic in-migration to the state, as well 
as a decrease in the state's birth rate caused this decline. During this decade, there were 
sufficient resources available from local property tax revenues and from the state's loan 
program to meet the various rehabilitation needs especially of those school districts that 
were experiencing enrollment declines. The State Allocation Board thus shifted its loan 
program emphasis from new construction to rehabilitation, and to upgrading unsafe 
facilities that were damaged due to the 1971 earthquake. 23 
Nevertheless, some school districts continued to experience enrollment growth in response 
to suburban housing developmem.24 IA spite of stu;;l:l growtl:l patteFRs, tne State AHeeatioo 
Board set its priorities to favor rehabilitation projects over new construction. The Board's 
orientation accentuated the differences between growing school districts and those that 
required rehabilitation, and caused an unequal state spending system that favored property 
rich urban districts over fiscally poor and growing suburban districts.25 
To counter the State Allocation Board's orientation toward urban rehabilitation, growing 
suburban school districts recognized that in order to fund new school construction, they 
would have to depend almost entirely on their local property tax base. As more people 
demanded affordable housing in suburban neighborhoods, developers accommodated them 
by building numerous suburban housing units. The sheer increase in the number of 
suburban homes added significant resources to the property tax base, thereby benefiting 
the school districts that served those communities. Furthermore, the ongoing demand for 
suburban housing caused the prices of homes in these areas to increase precipitously, 
adding even more resources to the property tax base. Although school districts could 
have requested to reduce those tax rates that supported them to a minimum amount, they 
did not. Most districts kept their rates steady, and some even increased them. 
Homeowners, unhappy about menacing property taxes, sought relief In 1972, the 
Legislature enacted a multi-year package, funded by the state's general fund, of $1.2 
billion for school operation to be allocated over a three-year period and to serve as 
property tax relief 26 In spite of this legislation, property taxes remained relatively high to 
cover local bond debt, and continued to be the primary source for school construction for 
growing school districts. Concurrently, the state continued to loan money to enrollment-
static school districts for the purpose of rehabilitation. 
Leroy Greene State School Building Lease Purchase Law 
In 1976, the Leroy Greene State School Building Lease Purchase Law was signed into 
legislation. 27 This law established a state fund to provide loans to school districts for 
reconstruction, modernization, and replacement of school facilities that were more than 30 
years old. The Act significantly altered the state's role in how school facilities 
construction was financed. Specifically, the state would no longer loan money; but it 
would finance school construction based on a leasing model.28 Although the legislation 
was passed, the voters of the State remained unconvinced that more money was needed to 
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improve schools. Consequently, they did not pass the bond initiative that was necessary to 
fund the Lease Purchase Program. 
The 1976 Act had specific language that created "priority points" for school districts that 
would apply for state funding. This was the first time that the State Allocation Board used 
a point system for creating a queue of approved projects. Priority points were given based 
on the number of unhoused students in the district, the rate of student enrollment growth, 
and how much rehabilitation a facility needed. Further, the Board instituted a first-come, 
first-served policy in which each accepted school district's application was stamped with a 
time and date. 
Under the previous program, the state loaned money to school districts to build their 
facilities, and the school distticts owned their property. UHaer the Gree:Re legislatioa, 
however, the State maintained a lien on the property for the duration of the loan via a 
lease purchase agreement. 29 The State wanted to preclude school districts from 
purchasing land on a speculative basis using State money, only to sell the State funded 
property at a profit at a later date. This meant that the state would control the disposition 
of any school facility that it financed until the school district repaid its obligation on the 
lease. 
The Proposition 13 Epoch 1978-1986 
Proposition 13-Local Governments and School Districts Fiscally Stymied 
With its passage, Proposition 13 eliminated the ability oflocal school districts to levy 
additional special property taxes to pay off their facility indebtedness. Proposition 13 
capped the ad valorem tax rate on real property at one percent of its value, thereby 
reducing the income from property taxes to such an extent that it virtually eliminated this 
source as a means for lease payments. Proposition 13 also prohibited the electorate of a 
school district from authorizing a tax over-ride to pay debt service on bonds for the 
purpose of constructing needed school facilities. 
To exacerbate this problem, the voters soundly defeated school construction bonds in both 
1976 and 1978. They were two of only three30 state general obligation bonds rejected by 
voters since 1947. The non-passage of these two successive bond initiatives, coupled with 
suburban enrollment growth, caused a statewide shortfall of$550 million31 that was 
needed for school construction projects throughout the state in 1978. 
Post Proposition 13 
The limitations set by Proposition 13 caused school districts, counties and cities to tum to 
the state, which had a $3.8 billion surplus, to fill the gap.32 In 1979, lawmakers approved 
a $2.7 billion (in 1978 dollars) "bailout" plan to assist schools and local govemments.33 
Within a year, the state surplus was reduced to roughly $1 billion. Furthermore, the state 
had taken on a larger role as a funding source for school operations and capital 
improvement. To that end, it expected school districts to conform to its programs and 
projects.34 
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Effects of Proposition 13 on the Lease Purchase Program 
In 1979, legislation implementing Proposition 13 included provisions for restructuring the 
State's Lease Purchase Program.35 School districts that received funds from the state 
were required to pay rent to the State as low as $1 per year, creating an "unofficial" grant 
program. 36 In addition, school districts were to contribute up to 10% of the project's cost 
from local funds. 37 However, many school districts could not raise these matching funds 
through local bonds. They requested that the State fund their entire projects. The State 
Allocation Board created a waiting list of projects. 
A Recession Further Complicates School Facility Financing 
Beginning in 1982, California was in a recession that lasted until 1984. During this time 
period, the State's budget surplus was expended. School districts' recession experiences 
were complicated by the fact that student enrollments again began to increase again. 38 
Approximately 60 percent of California's 1,034 districts at the time projected annual 
growth rates of over two percent between 1980-81 and 1983-84, with some districts 
projecting a doubling in their enrollment?9 At the same time, estimates indicated that over 
one-third ofthe State's school buildings were over 30 years old and many needed 
substantial rehabilitation.40 The Coalition for Adequate School Housing (CASH) 
estimated that the one-time cost of rehabilitating these older facilities would be $1.9 
billion. 41 Further, CASH estimated that school districts would need an additional $400 
million annually for the next five years for building and repairing school buildings. Since 
the State was in recession, such funds were not available. Thus the State had to rethink 
how it would prioritize its school facilities projects. 
A New System for Funding School Construction 
In light of the backlog of applications for state funds, the Office of Local Assistance (now 
known as the Office of Public School Construction) designed a numerical ranking system 
that used "priority points" to determine a school district's eligibility for funds. This 
system gave priority to school districts who had students who were "unhoused," and 
special consideration was given to how districts used certain facilities. 42 The more points a 
project application received, the higher on the list it was placed. Recognizing that school 
districts were facing enrollment growth and required further rehabilitation, the Legislature 
in 1982 authorized a general fund appropriation of $200 million for school construction 
projects. This amount was later reduced to $100 million.43 
Further, in order to ease the burden that many school districts felt because of the 
recession, the State loosened the repayment schedule for its lease-purchase program. 
School districts were allowed, for 10 years, to pay one percent of the cost of state funded 
lease-purchase projects, rather than the 10 percent they initially were required to pay. 44 
Again, the State Legislature and the State Allocation Board moved away from a loan 
program and more toward a grant program. 
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Multi-Track Year-Round Education 
Recognizing that the State had very limited bond resources, the Legislature wanted a more 
cost-effective facilities financing incentive system for school districts. That system would 
force districts to use their space more efficiently. In response to the shift in policy, the 
Legislature passed Chapter 498, Statute of 1983. This statute encouraged school districts 
that were experiencing growth pressure to adopt multi-track year-round education 
(MTYRE) programs. MTYRE programs enroll students in several tracks throughout the 
entire calendar year. At any given time, one track is on vacation, but vacation periods are 
short in duration. 45 The MTYRE program allows a more intensive use of existing 
facilities, thereby reducing the need for new facilities in growing districts. 
School districts received an immediate financial tetmn if they participated in the ~MTYRE 
program. A school district that redirected its students into a MTYRE program received a 
grant of up to 10 percene6 of the cost that would be necessary to build a new facility not 
to exceed $125 per student. 47 School districts that participated in MTYRE were eligible 
for air conditioning and insulation in their buildings. 
In 1988, as pressure for state financing continued, the Legislature required that top 
priority for financing new construction projects be given to districts that used multi-track 
year-round education programs. School districts that offered MTYRE and were willing to 
match 50 percent of their construction costs received a funding priority from the State 
Allocation Board. 48 This put other school districts that could not meet these MTYRE and 
funding criteria at a distinct disadvantage. These latter school districts sought relief from 
the voters in 1986. Small school districts were one exception to the MTYRE requirement. 
1986 Lease Purchase Program 
In 1986, the voters approved Proposition 46. Proposition 46 amended Proposition 1349 by 
restoring to local governments, including school districts, the ability to issue general 
obligation bonds and to levy a property tax increase to pay the debt service subject to a 
two-thirds vote ofthe local electorate. 5° This amendment allowed school districts to 
augment the one-percent cap on property taxes and to secure additional bond indebtedness 
to build and improve their schools. 51 
Passage ofProposition 46 helped, but did not solve school districts' financing problems. 
Many school districts were unable to secure the necessary two-thirds vote to authorize 
local funding, and still relied on state funding to assist them. Further, the federal 
government in 1986 passed legislation that required each state to remove friable asbestos 
from their educational facilities - another charge that the school districts could ill afford. 
California adopted similar asbestos standards to those established by the federal 
government in 1986; however, few school districts reported their estimated costs for 
removing the substance. In light of the need to remove the asbestos, and in order to 
address the growing backlog of proposed school construction projects, voters passed 
Proposition 79 in 1988- an $800 million bond initiative. It specifically set aside $100 
million to cover asbestos removal. 52 
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A Growing Shortfall and Greater Scrutiny 
There is no doubt that from 1982 to 1988 state support for public school construction was 
limited and difficult to secure. The demand for new school facilities, for modernization, 
and for asbestos removal was great. 53 As of June 1, 1986, applications that were 
submitted by school districts to the State Allocation Board for state funding of new school 
construction projects alone totaled roughly $1.3 billion. In addition, applications for state 
funding for reconstruction or rehabilitation of school facilities totaled over $991 million. 54 
Total demand for school facility improvement in 1986 was nearly $2.3 billion- an amount 
that significantly outweighed the $800 million voters approved in that year's bond 
initiative.55 Even with a boost of funding of$150 million per year from Tidelands 
revenues in fiscal years 1984 and 1985, the Lease Purchase Program fell short 56 By 1988, 
the shortfall had grown to $4 billion, in spite of the fact that voters had approved $2.5 
billion in bond money from 1982-1988. 
The State Allocation Board was forced to scrutinize every request for school construction 
funding, recognizing that absent a major infusion of State bond money, most districts 
would not receive funding for their projects. This scrutiny created an extremely 
competitive environment for the limited resources that were available to the schools. 
Many participants believe that school districts that contracted with knowledgeable 
consultants, or had district staff who were familiar with the State Allocation Board's 
policies and criteria, were the most successful in securing a high ranking place in the queue 
for resources, once those funds become available. 
There is no definitive research or data that support this belief Consultants are not 
required to report their involvement in the application process. However, there is 
substantial anecdotal evidence to support the assertion. 
School Financing as a Collective Effort-The Three Legged Stool 
In 1986, the Legislature recognized that resources were scarce and that no one 
governmental or private entity could finance school construction. It attempted to equalize 
the burden of school facilities financing between state government, local government and 
the private sector.57 This concept was known as the "three legged stooL" The idea was 
that the state would provide funds through bonds. Local government would provide its 
share through special taxes, general obligation, Mello-Roos and other bond proceeds. The 
private sector would provide funds through developer fees. Appendix A describes funding 
alternatives for these latter two legs of the stool. 
The "three legged stool," however, never quite worked. For example, to assure that 
developers would not fund a disproportionate share of the cost to build schools, the 
Legislature, in 1986, capped the amount new homebuyers would pay for developer fees at 
$1.50 per square foot, and empowered the State Allocation Board to raise the cap by a 
certain amount each year. However, school districts found a loophole around the cap by 
requesting that cities impose a fee on their behalf, and cities imposed rates on some 
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developers that exceeded those allowed. 58 California courts upheld these fees in the Mira, 
Hart, Murrieta court cases. 
Until the recent passage ofProposition 1A, many local governments have imposed 
developer fees that exceed those allowed by the Board. For example, in 1987, fees in San 
Diego and Orange counties reached a high of $8700 per house. 59 By 1990, total 
development fees for some homes reached $30,000.60 Statewide, developer fees have 
increased from $3 1 million in 1978 to $200 million in 1997. 
In 1998, the State Allocation Board increased the fee to $1.93 per square foot. 61 With the 
passage ofProposition 1A in November 1998, however, local governments have 
apparently lost their ability to increase their fees beyond those determined by the State 
AlloeatioA: Board. Further contlict is likely. 
The 1990s-Complicated Funding Programs 
In the fall of 1990, the Legislature passed legislation that created two programs that 
provided additional financial incentives for schools to offer year-round education.62 The 
first of these programs provided a one-time grant to school districts to ease the expense of 
changing from traditional nine-month programs to year-round tracks. The second 
program provided an "operating grant" of between 50 percent and 90 percent of the 
amount districts saved the state by not having to build new schools. At the 
recommendation of the Office of the Legislative Analyst, the Legislature repealed the 
1982 and 1986 incentive programs discussed above. 63 
In response to the 1990 legislation, the State Allocation Board developed a new priority 
system for allocating lease purchase money. Under this new system, the Board 
apportioned funds based on a combination of when an application was received and how 
many priority points it garnered. Through a complex formula, priority points were given 
to schools that had a significant number of"unhoused students," or had substantial 
rehabilitation needs. This procedure might have worked well if the state could have 
financed all applications in a timely manner. However, the demand for state money 
increased to the point where districts without special priorities could expect to wait years 
for the state to finance their projects. 
The program was in effect for only one year when the Legislature repealed the program 
and created yet another system for allocating state money. 64 In 1991, the Legislature 
defined six priorities for funding. First priority was given to districts that had a 
"substantial"65 enrollment in multi-track schedules, and that were paying at least 50 
percent of the construction costs for their new schools. Second priority went to districts 
with a "substantial" year-round enrollment and that wanted the state to pay the entire cost 
of any new construction for their year -round schools. The remaining four priority levels 
took into consideration factors for those schools who did not meet the "substantial 
enrollment" criteria outlined above, or were unable to match state resources. 
The complex set of formulas made it difficult for school districts to completely understand 
what criteria would best serve them. Further, throughout this period, the Board was 
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required to implement new programs and redefine its priorities. For example, in 1990 the 
Legislature created a program that was adopted by State Allocation Board for school 
districts that could not find adequate land on which to build a school. Known as the 
Space Saver Program, it was designed to assist urban school districts that could not obtain 
adequate acreage for a school campus. The first space saver school, developed in 1993, is 
scheduled to be completed in Spring 2000 in the Santa Ana Unified School District, in a 
former shopping mall. 66 
Another example of shifting priorities took place in 1996 when the Legislature mandated 
the Board to redirect its third highest priority to class size reduction from a previous focus 
on child-care facilities. 57 A third took place at the end of 1997 when the priority points 
system was replaced by a first-come, first served system. While there were exceptions to 
this rule, money was offered first to school districts willing to cover some of the costs 
~··~·~~····················~·-~··~associatoo witli constructing or repairing facilities. Schools that could not afford to cover 
the remaining 50 percent were placed on a separate list. 
Such shifts in policy, coupled with the significant complexity of formulas that drove the 
priority point system, along with the sporadic creation of new programs, caused many 
school districts to depend on outside consultants. These consultants understood the many 
policy changes that the Board enacted - sometimes on a monthly basis. They were also 
knowledgeable of new programs, and clearly understood the workings of the staffwho 
carried forth the Board's policies. Without the assistance of consultants, school districts 
were unable to keep track of policy changes and special considerations enacted by the 
Board. Further, while the Board and its staff advised school districts regarding changes in 
their policies in a regularly published document, it did not provide a centralized source of 
materials, such as an up-to-date handbook. Consequently, school district personnel were 
often uninformed about the various nuances of the programs administered by the Board. 
State Bond Efforts of the Nineties 
As the State Allocation Board shifted its focus and policies throughout the early 1990s, 
Californians approved state school bond initiatives in 1990 for $1.6 billion and in 1992 for 
$2.8 billion. In one of its 1992 reports, the Department ofFinance reported that statewide 
K-12 enrollment was estimated to grow by 200,000 new students per year for at least five 
years, 68 and that an estimated $3 billion would be needed annually for new school 
construction. 69 However, in spite of growing enrollments and a significant demand for 
facility rehabilitation, in 1994, the electorate rejected a $1 billion bond initiative. The 
State was in a recession. 
A lack of State bond funds was not the only problem associated with the allocation of 
school construction funds. The Auditor General reported in 1991 that the Office ofLocal 
Assistance mismanaged state funds. It detailed that construction funds loaned to school 
districts were not recovered; that districts overpaid on some projects and failed to collect 
the overage; that it dispersed funds without proper documentation; and that it failed to 
conduct required close-out audits on construction projects.70 
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As a result of this audit, the Office ofPublic School Construction in concert with the State 
Allocation Board developed stringent internal and external audits and fiscal controls. 
These control mechanisms included increasing the detail of financial review of projects, 
prohibiting school districts from participating in the program unless a balance was not due, 
and no longer receiving rent checks for portable classrooms. 71 
Attempts to Ease Passage for Local Bonds 
Recognizing that the State would be unable to fund the entire backlog of school 
construction proposals, Governor Pete Wilson in 1992 proposed a constitutional 
amendment to reduce the requirement for the passage oflocal bonds from two-thirds to a 
simple majority. 72 The idea was that local governments should have to meet the same 50 
percent requirement as the State for passing bonds. Further, there was strong sentiment in 
the Wilson administration that local governments should pay an increased share of school 
construction costs. However, the Legislature rejected his plan. 73 Other attempts in recent 
years to reduce the vote for passage oflocal bonds from two-thirds to something less have 
also failed. 74 
1996 School Bond Issuance -Finally More Money 
Proposition 203, passed by the voters in March 1996, provided $2.065 billion for school 
facility construction. However, the Legislature at the time estimated that school districts 
would need $7 billion in construction funds to meet enrollment growth that was 
anticipated during the next five years.75 This $7 billion did not include the needs ofLos 
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), which had 20 percent of the state's student 
population. At the time, LAUSD alone needed $3 billion to upgrade and modernize its 
schools. 76 Clearly, anticipated demand for State funds substantially exceeded available 
resources. 
To respond to the many school district proposals, the State Allocation Board followed its 
general priority points policy. However, many school districts, recognizing that they 
would not receive funding for years because of their position in the funding queue, and 
because of the limited amount of resources that were available, resorted to creative means 
to try to secure funding for their projects. For example, some schools districts sought 
special consideration for funds by requesting emergency allocations. Such a tactic would 
allow a school district to receive funds immediately.77 Other school districts used the 
appeals process to argue that their projects were needed more than those of other school 
districts that were higher in the queue. 78 
This cannibalistic dynamic caused a fair amount of resentment among those school 
districts that were bumped from a relatively high position in the queue by those districts 
that sought emergency relief or special consideration. Further, it was clear that the most 
sophisticated school districts found a variety of tactics that would secure the funding of 
their projects. These tactics are described in greater detail later in this paper under the 
section that describes how the Board processed its applications. 
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Class Size Reduction Causes Greater Housing Needs 
The distribution of funds from Proposition 203 was further complicated by the Governor's 
Class Size Reduction Initiative. In particular, the State Allocation Board earmarked $95 
million for the purpose of purchasing 2,500 portable classrooms for schools that were 
facing severe classroom shortages. This was in addition to $200 million that the 
Department ofEducation had available for assisting schools in purchasing such facilities. 
The Office ofPublic School Construction determined that a total of 17,500 classrooms 
were needed to accommodate class size reduction, and that there was only enough money 
to fund less than half of the estimated need. 79 The State Allocation Board reinterpreted 
Proposition 203 by creating a new Portables Purchase Program at the expense of their 
other programs. This caused some school districts to again get bumped in the queue for 
Never Enough Money-Still a Shortfall 
Since1947, the electorate has approved all but three State bond initiatives. In spite of the 
voters' tendency to support various bond initiatives, by 1998, the backlog of school 
construction projects that were approved by the State Allocation Board, but unfunded, 
totaled more than $1.3 billion. Although the voters have been generous by approving 
bond initiatives roughly every two years, 80 there were times during the past five decades 
when bond money was not available for periods of four or six years. 81 
The Department of Finance has estimated that $16 billion is needed over the next decade 
for public school construction and rehabilitation. 82 Various bond proposals in 1997 and 
1998 were circulated that considered multiple-year bond issuances. The California 
Teachers Association and the California Building Industry Association presented a plan to 
issue $2 billion a year for 10 years. 83 Governor Wilson proposed $2 billion a year for four 
consecutive years. In the end, Proposition IA was passed. It provides $6.7 billion over a 
four-year period. However, while the amount appears generous, it will not be enough to 
meet the entire anticipated need of the state. Based on the Department of Finance 
projections, the six years following this bond issue will require roughly an additional $10 
billion in State money. 
Table 1 on page 18 shows the history of state school bond initiatives from 1949 to 1998. 
In the next sections of this report, we discuss the various programs, the complicated 
application process used by the State Allocation Board that school districts had to endure 
to secure funding, and how Proposition 1A attempts to simplify this process. 
California Research Bureau, California State Library 19 
Table 1- STATE SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION BONDS 
Title of Bond Initiative 
School Building Aid Law of 1949 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
l"' .... h"nl J;l,;1r1;no. A irl T .~W' nf 1 Q-"? ..., 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 
School Building Aid Law of 1952 And Earthquake 
School Building Lease-Purchase Bond Law 
of 1976 (Failed) 
School Building Aid Law of 1978 (Failed) 
School Building Lease-Purchase Bond Law of 1982 
School Building Lease-Purchase Bond Law of 1984 
Green-Hughes School Building Lease-Purchase 
School Facilities Bond Act of 1988 
1988 School Facilities Bond Act 
1990 School Facilities Bond Act 
School Facilities Bond Act of 1990 
School Facilities Bond Act of 1992 
1992 School Facilities Bond Act 
Safe Schools Act of 1994 (Failed) 
iPublic Education Facilities Bond Act of 1996, 
Proposition 203 
Date & Year of 
Election 
November 8, 1949 
November 4, 1952 
November 2, 1954 
November 4, 1958 
June 7, 1960 
June 5, 1962 
November 3, 1964 
June 7 1966 
June 6, 1972 
November 5, 1974 
June 8, 1976 
June 6, 1978 
November 2, 1982 
November 6, 1984 
November 4, 1986 
June 7, 1988 
November 8, 1988 
June 5, 1990 
November 6, 1990 
June 2, 1992 
November 3, 1992 
June 7, 1994 
March 1996 
,Class-size Reduction Kindergarten-University Public November 3, 1998 
Education Facilities Bond Act of 1998, 
Proposition 1 A 


























A) New amount of 1966 bond authorization available for regular program is $185.5 million 
after deducting $3 5 million reserved for compensatory education facilities, $9.5 million for 
regional occupational centers, and $3 5 million for rehabilitation and replacement of 
earthquake damaged and unsafe schools. 
B) Up to 250 million dollars earmarked for rehabilitation and replacement of unsafe schools. 
C) One billion dollars earmarked for higher education facilities 
D) Two and one-halfbillion dollars is allocated for higher education. 
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THE PROGRAMS 
Prior to the approval ofProposition lA, the State Allocation Board oversaw six active 
programs associated with school facility construction, repair, and remodeling. These six 
programs made up the Lease-Purchase Program that was discussed earlier in this paper. 
This section briefly describes these programs, discusses how the State Allocation Board 
set priorities for school district projects, explains how the Office of Public School 
Construction staff reviewed and acted upon district proposals, and how the State 
Allocation Board considered district appeals. The purpose is to advise the reader of not 
only the process and administration of allocation, but also some of the pitfalls that existed 
under the old system. Perhaps these pitfalls of the old system can be avoided when 
allocating Proposition lA resources. 
The Growth and Modernization Programs 
The Growth and Modernization Programs allocated funds to school districts for building new 
schools (Growth Program) and for repairing existing facilities (Modernization Program). 
School districts qualified for the Growth Program based on an "allowable building standards" 
formula. 
For its Growth Program, the State Allocation Board developed standards for the amount of 
space that was necessary to house students based on a district's number of ADA (Average 
Daily Attendance).84 The Modernization Program provided funds to school districts for 
nonstructural improvements to permanent school facilities that were more than 3 0 years old, 
and for portable buildings that were more than 20 years old. Such nonstructural improvements 
included interior partitions, air conditioning, plumbing, lighting and electrical systems. 
The Modernization Program provided funding for up to 25 percent of the replacement value of 
the building. Under some circumstances, districts could use additional funds beyond the 25 
percent for handicap access compliance, including elevators when appropriate, and for 
alternate energy systems. 
School districts could apply to this program by offering to match state funds and be listed as 
"Priority One," or they could ask the State to fund their entire project and be listed as "Priority 
Two." 
Process for Receiving Growth and Modernization Funds 
School districts that applied for growth and/or modernization funds were required to 
follow nine steps in three critical areas - planning, site selection and construction. Each of 
these three critical areas provided a separate and gradual funding stream for the school's 
project. 
Planning Phase 
During the planning phase, a district was required to complete four forms that 
demonstrated that it was eligible for either the growth or modernization program. 
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Eligibility to participate in the programs was based on enrollment patterns or the age and 
condition of those schools that required modernization. If a district met these standards, it 
moved on to the "site development phase." 
Site Development Phase 
Selecting a school site was critical. If a school district was participating in the 
modernization program, it would move to the next phase. The site would have to be safe 
and able to support the school's curriculum. An adequate site would have to meet certain 
standards with respect to size and location. Site review could take a school district 
months (if not years) to investigate. Under the growth program, a school district arranged 
a search committee to locate available properties and narrowed its search to three sites. In 
addition, the seh:ool distriet held public hearings regarding the impact of the hmds to be 
used for educational purposes, and notified neighbors about possible site use. A 
representative from the Department of Education visited three selected sites to review and 
determine which was the most suitable site based on criteria including, but not limited to: 
street traffic safety; traffic congestion; geological hazards; and other environmental issues. 
All school districts followed a similar process for site selection whether they financed the 
project themselves, or requested State funding. 85 
Some school districts were unable to build new schools because they could not secure 
appropriate properties. This was especially true in urban and industrial areas where vacant 
land was not readily available or was extremely expensive. 86 
Once a district found an appropriate property, it was required to prepare a site 
development plan that included architectural and engineering drawings, along with 
building contract agreements. Districts were required to follow strict site development, 
plan development, and construction cost guidelines in order to be eligible for state funds. 87 
Once these guidelines were met, the district proceeded to the construction phase. 
Construction Phase 
Every construction project received an allowance for site development and to erect a 
building. The eligible costs associated with construction for these programs were 
classified into several broad categories: building construction; site development; energy 
conservation; and supplemental funding for multi-story construction. In addition, facility 
funding included adjustment costs associated with geographic and regional differences, or 
the demolition of an existing structure. 
A project architect for each contract developed final plans and documents as part of the 
project's final stage. These documents were used to establish a construction budget. The 
Division of the State Architect approved and monitored the district's final plans. After 
review, a construction apportionment was recommended to the State Allocation Board, 
which in turn authorized the distribution of funds. Upon completion of all regulatory 
oversight, the district was allowed to break ground. 
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The Deferred Maintenance Program 
The Deferred Maintenance Program provided a 50 percent State match to assist school 
districts with expenditures for major repair or replacement of school buildings. Such 
repairs or replacements were for plumbing, heating, air conditioning, electrical systems, 
roofing, interior and exterior painting, and floor systems. School districts were required 
to place one and one-half percent of their general funds into an escrow account in order to 
receive a State match. For school districts that could not fit the parameters of the 
modernization program, the deferred maintenance program was the only alternative to 
receive State assistance. 
The State also provided critical hardship funds to repair buildings that might seriously 
affect the health and/or safety of pupils. When available funding was insufficient to 1hlly 
fund all hardship requests in any given year, the State Allocation Board created a priority 
list. However, the State Allocation Board often made exceptions to its list. 
The Deferred Maintenance Program differed from the modernization program in that 
school districts were required to submit a five-year plan as to how their projects would be 
implemented. The plan displayed a rank for each project, and identified those projects that 
the school district would likely fund. 
Deferred Maintenance Application Process 
Based on the most recent available material, the deferred maintenance program had 13 
steps, and a school district needed to complete several forms and documents. The 13 
steps were divided into categories including a letter of interest, application process, critical 
hardship project documentation, and fund release. 
A school district notified the Office of Public School Construction each year if it wanted 
to participate. Upon receipt of the initial letter, the Office ofPublic School Construction 
would send the district a request for its five-year plan of maintenance needs and an 
"Annual Application for Funds." 
The school district would then provide the OPSC with a list of items scheduled for major 
repair or replacement, 88 along with its five-year implementation plan. When the district 
received state funds, it could only expend those resources for those items on the list. It 
could not redirect any resources toward administrative overhead, repair and maintenance 
of furniture, ongoing preventative maintenance, energy conservation, landscaping and 
irrigation, athletic stadium equipment, drapery or blackout curtains, testing underground 
storage tanks for leaks, or chalkboards. 
Once the Office ofPublic School Construction approved a school district's list of projects 
it allocated funds accordingly. In cases of hardship, OPSC would visit the school prior to 
allocating funds. The district's governing board controlled and was responsible for all 
deferred maintenance funds. These funds were placed in a special escrow account. 
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The Year-Round Air Conditioning/Insulation Program 
The Year-Round Air Conditioning/Insulation Program (ACI) began in 1986, as an 
incentive program for schools to operate during the summer.89 In order to participate in 
the program, a school district was required to have a plan for Multi-Track Year-Round 
Education, or have 10 percent of its students enrolled in a Multi-Track Year-Round 
Education program. The ACI program assisted school districts by providing resources for 
air conditioning and insulation. 
Year-Round Schools Air Conditioning/Insulation Application Process 
The application process for the ACI program differed slightly for those school districts 
that had a year-wand program from those that were plamuag a y8ar rounrJ program 
However, regardless of their status, school districts were required to complete eleven 
stages in two phases to receive funding. If a school district had an air conditioning system 
that needed repair, it could not apply to this program, but could apply for funds under the 
deferred maintenance program. 
A school district completed forms that included information on the buildings and spaces 
that would be affected, along with a report regarding the project's anticipated start-date. 
In addition, another application was required that provided information on whether the 
school site was experiencing enrollment growth, and whether some level of modernization 
was already in progress. Further, a school district that was not on a year-round schedule 
was required to show how its year-round calendar would be used. If the district was 
approved for funding, various allowances were provided to the district. 90 In addition to 
these allowances, the state would provide funds for gas and electric service, general site 
development, and air conditioning/insulation construction. 
Items that were not covered by this program included costs for heating, window solar 
film, classroom doors and hardware, re-roofing, lighting, security, interior housing, fire 
alarm systems, unrelated repairs, installations, and painting. 
The State Relocatable Classroom Program 
The Relocatable Classroom program was designed to meet the needs of school districts 
that were impacted by excessive growth or unforeseen classroom emergencies. The State 
Allocation Board allocated funds for the acquisition, installation, and relocation of safe 
portable classroom facilities. The State maintained a fleet of 5,000 furnished classrooms 
that could be leased to school districts for $4,000 per year. Hardship cases could lease 
portables for $2,000 per year. These portable units were available on a first-come, first-
served basis. However, there was no maximum amount of time a school district could 
keep the portables, and districts were not required to return them. Thus, some school 
districts have kept the portables indefinitely. 
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Relocatable Classroom Application Process 
In order to participate in either relocatable classroom program, a school district was 
responsible for site preparation costs including electrical hookup, plumbing connection, a 
State Architect approved plan, insurance and maintenance. After approval by the Board, 
the district would be reimbursed for the cost of architect fees, electrical hookup, furniture 
and equipment, and plumbing installation. However, reimbursements were capped at 
$9,450 per classroom. 
The Unused Site Program 
The Unused Site Program was established in 1974 as part of the General Lease-Purchase 
umbrella. It required school districts and count su erintendents of schools to a a fee 
or tstnct properties that were not used for "official" school purposes. "Official" school 
purpose was defined as being used for K-12 education, continuing or adult education, 
special education, childcare, or administration of any educational units. 
This program did not provide funds directly to schools. However, resources generated 
from the fees that districts paid for unused facilities were used to cover deferred 
maintenance costs and to service the debt on the state's various school construction 
bonds. Since the Board simply administered the return of funds to the state, the funds 
could not be redirected to other programs administered by the Board. Proposition 1A 
eliminates their fee requirements. 
The Office of Public School Construction Staff Review and The State Allocation 
Board's Appeals Process 
The State Allocation Board meets roughly 11 times a year. At each meeting the Board 
reviews and approves about 200 applications for funding. Prior to the State Allocation 
Board's review, the Office of Public School Construction staff processes all applications. 
Before Proposition 1 A, the approval processes for the programs, except for the growth 
and modernization programs, were straightforward. Either a school district's application 
fit a program's description for reimbursement, or it did not. Due to the complicated 
nature of the Growth and Modernization programs, "special considerations," or project 
applications that did not fit in the parameters of the program were placed in a different 
category. The State Allocation Board approved roughly 90 percent of all growth and 
modernization projects without special consideration. Issues requiring special 
consideration could include peculiarities of the proposed site, or the costs associated with 
a project. The applications were divided into special consents or "specials," and appeals. 
Both types permitted the Office of Public School Construction staff great latitude in the 
decision-making process, as they investigated and evaluated school district applications on 
a case-by-case basis. 
A "special" occurred when OPSC staff reviewed a school district's application that did not 
meet the standards of the program, and determined that an exception should be made. 
This agreement may have required several meetings between the school district's 
administration and the OPSC staff. With OPSC staff recommendation, which may have 
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been inconsistent with State Allocation Board policy, this application would be brought 
before the State Allocation Board for review. This category was normally granted 
approval in one action. 
An appeal occurred when OPSC staff reviewed a school district's application that did not 
meet the standards of the program, and determined an exception should not be made. If 
after several meetings an agreement could not be reached, the school district would bring 
its case before the State Allocation Board. An appeal was granted only on a case-by-case 
basis. At times, legislators have spoken on behalf of school districts at Board meetings. 91 
The difference in the two types of special considerations was that a school district or its 
representative would have to defend its actions in an appeal. However, as already noted, 
only those people who kept up with the process and policy changes were adept enough to 
tackle an appeal. Therefere, a sefioel distriet seekiag an appeal before the State 
Allocation Board might seek help from legislators that represented them, or hire 
consultants. For instance, in the May 1998 State Allocation Board meeting, a well-versed 
school finance consultant appeared on behalf of the Apple Valley Unified School District. 
Apple Valley hired both a construction manager and a general contractor to erect its new 
school, in the face of board policies allowing a school district to hire only one such 
position. On behalf of the school district, the consultant addressed the State Allocation 
Board, and pointed out that in five other cases the State Allocation Board had voted in 
favor of a school district that hired both a general contractor and a construction 
manager.92 
Less seasoned district representatives would not have known that the State Allocation 
Board had already set a precedent for funding projects that include both a construction 
manager and a general contractor.93 The OPSC staff was not knowledgeable on this issue 
and therefore could not be a source of information. 
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PROPOSITION lA-A POSSIBLE FIX TO SAB PROCESS 
PROBLEMS 
Proposition 1A not only authorizes an additional $6.7 billion to K-12 schools, but it also 
offers a fix to several of the process problems discussed above. It replaces the provisions 
of the previous Lease-Purchase Program. This section discusses (1) the resource 
allocation provisions of the legislation; (2) the programmatic components ofthe 
legislation; and (3) how the legislation improves the resource allocation process over that 
which existed under previous bond programs. 
Total Resource Allocation Provisions of Proposition lA 
The resource allocatioa system ia Propositiofl lA is specific and detai:ied. Bond pwceeds 
are to be allocated in 2 two-year cycles: $3.35 billion available immediately; and $3.35 
billion available after July 2, 2000. Ofthe $3.35 billion that is immediately available, 
$1.35 billion is earmarked for new construction, $800 million for modernization, $500 
million for hardship cases, and $700 million for class-size reduction. 
For the second $3.35 billion distribution, $1.55 billion will be available for new 
construction, $1.3 billion for modernization, and $500 million for hardship cases. There 
are no resources in the second allocation for class-size reduction. 
School districts receive funding for their projects based on a per pupil formula. The 
formula is based on a statewide average cost for construction, adjusted each January for 
inflation. The figures are based on unhoused 94average daily attendance (ADA). The per 












It is anticipated that the initial $1.35 billion available for new construction during the first 
round of allocations will be insufficient to meet the needs of those school districts that are 
facing substantial enrollment growth. Proposition 1 A establishes a priority point system 
for new construction projects when State bond resources are exhausted. 95 The Office of 
Public School Construction will process applications on a first-come, first-served basis 
from subsequent bond offerings. 
In addition to the provisions outlined above, school districts that receive bond proceeds 
are required to set aside three percent of their general funds each year for 20 years for the 
purpose of deferred maintenance. 
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Components of Proposition lA 
Proposition lA establishes three categories for funding. The first is the Growth Program, 
in which the State finances half the cost of new construction and the school district the 
other half The second is the Modernization Program, in which 80 percent of the cost of 
rehabilitation is provided by the state and 20 percent by the school district. The third 
category is "hardship," in which the State funds up to 100 percent of the cost for 
emergency needs, or an increased proportion of its share for new construction or 
modernization. 96 
Proposition 1A holds harmless those school districts that received State Allocation Board 
approval for the construction phase of their projects (under the previous Priority 1 - able 
to pro"v'ide a 50 pereeHt matek). They vfill rec8iV8 growth alld modemizatian fimds, but 
under the rubric of the previous "Lease Purchase Program." This grant is supplemented 
by land costs, site development, and other adjustments. 
Another new provision of the Proposition is that school districts can seek modernization 
resources after a facility is 25 years old, rather than 30 years under the previous program. 
Schools districts that had received prior Board approval for Priority 2 projects ( 100 
percent state funding) will have to either indicate their ability to finance 50 percent of their 
proposed projects or reapply under one of the new programs. If the school district cannot 
meet the provisions of the new programs, it can apply as a "hardship" case. 
The California Supreme Court ruled in 1991 that cities and counties could limit housing 
development on the basis of the supply of classrooms.97 Proposition 1A suspends, until 
2006, the Court's ruling.98 With the passage ofProposition lA, school districts will not be 
able to limit new housing construction based on a rationale that school facilities do not 
exist. However, in 2006, if adequate bond funds for new construction are not available, 
cities and counties can once again deny development. Further, as discussed earlier, the 
Proposition permits the school board to increase developer fees to up to $1.93 per square 
foot. 99 Proposition 1A sets up a system where fees can be levied ofup to 50 percent and 
100 percent of the costs associated with building a school by developers under certain 
circumstances. 
Proposition lA Improves the Resource Allocation System of the State Allocation 
Board 
Proposition 1A makes several changes to the programs administered by the State 
Allocation Board. It attempts to simplify the process of applying for funds, consolidates 
the Board's previous six programs into two, and attempts to create a more equitable 
funding system. It also makes the State Allocation Board and the Office ofPublic School 
Construction staff more accountable for their actions. Table 2 presents the differences 
between the Board's previous Lease Purchase Program, and the new programs that are 
initiated by Proposition 1A. 
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Table 2- Companson of Lease Purchase Program to Proposition lA ProJ?;rams 
LEASE PURCHASE PROGRAM SCHOOL FACILITIES 
PROGRAM PROP 1A 
FUNDING FACILITIES Priority 1 projects-growth and 
modernization-received 50 percent 
funding based on actual costs from 
the state. 
CONSTRUCTION 





Priority 2 projects-growth and 
modernization-received 1 00 percent 
funding form the state. 
Some excessive costs (i.e., change 
orders) were reimbursed by the state. 
Cost savings were returned to the 
state. 
Buildings must be at least 30 years 
old. 
Projects were approved three times 
in conjunction with the planning, site 
acquisition and construction phases. 
Growth projects receive 50 
percent funding based on a per 
pupil formula from the state. 
Modernization projects receive 
80% funding from the state. 
Hardship projects can receive up 
to 100 percent of funding from 
the state based on three broad 
-o clo;;;>) ' pny:stcal ana 
excessive costs. 
Excessive costs are not 
reimbursed by the state and school 
districts keep costs savings. 
Buildings must be at least 25 
years old. 
Projects receive one approval 
(except hardships that receive two 
approvals). 






Required school districts to set aside 
two percent of their general fund for 
ongoing maintenance. 
State maintains a lien to properties it 
funds. 
Division of State Architect approved 
all plans. 
California Research Bureau, California State Library 
approves plans, unless there is a 
hardship. 
Requires school districts to set 
aside three percent of their 
general funds for 20 years for 
ongoing maintenance. 
State does not hold liens, and 
existing liens are released. 
The Division of State Architect or 
a state approved private 
engineering firm may approve 
plans. 1 
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LEASEPURCHASEPROG~ SCHOOL FACILITIES 
PROG~PROP 1A 
DEVELOPER FEES The cap on fees was $1.93 per square The cap on fees is $1.93 per 
foot; however, cities or counties could square foot, adjusted 
levy a higher fee and pass it to schools biannually. Fees may be 
districts. assessed up to 50 percent of 
the costs of a project if a 
school district has accessed 
other forms of financing 
including Mello-Roos, G. 0. 
bonds, and parcel taxes. In 
order to increase fees, school 
~ 
ut;:.LuvL;:. Htu;:.L lllv'-'• ... ,,..., v.~. 
four criteria, including 
MTYJUS, local school bond 
positive votes of 50 + 1 
percent, 20 percent of 
students are housed in 
portables, 15 percent ofbond 
debt used. 
WHEN STATE FUNDS Projects were placed on a pending Modernization projects may 
RUN DRY state-funding list or charged a city- be placed on a pending state-
based developer fee. funding list. Growth projects 
may be placed on a priority 
points list, or the school 
district may collect 100 
percent of financing from a 
developer. 
CONTAINING Cities and counties on behalf of school School districts can not 
DEVELOPMENT districts were able to contain request cities or counties to 
(MIRA, HART residential development by suspending prohibit residential 
MURRIETA COURT the building of new facilities. development based on a lack 
CASES) of funds or school facilities 
until2006. 
ARCHITECT& Percentage caps on fees based on size No caps. 
CONSTRUCTION of projects 
MANAGEMENT FEES 
MODERNIZATION Provides funding to building over 30 Provides funding for buildings 
PROGRAM years old, and portables over 25 years over 25 years old and 
old. Calculations done on a district portables over 20 years old. 
basis. Provides funding on a site-
specific basis. 
AIRCONDITIONING- Allotted funds specifically to install These are now incorporated in 
ASBESTOS PROGRAM AC and remove asbestos. the modernization program. 
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Simplification 
To further simplify the process, the Proposition reduced the number of school facility 
financing phases from three to one. 100 This is now possible because school districts receive 
a flat grant from the State based on the number of students they enroll, rather than on the 
estimated cost of a project. Under the previous program, each phase of a project was 
evaluated independently; thus the cost to the State for any given project could change. 
Under the new program, a school district receives a single grant for a single project, and 
cannot request that the state fund additional need beyond the original request. 101 
The Proposition also explicitly requires that the State Allocation Board initiate a public 
hearing process that notices any policy changes considered by the Board. It requires that 
the BoMd FBake available to sehool distrrcts written up-to-date documentation that clearly 
explains its policies, and specifically describes how its new programs work. 
Consolidation 
Until Proposition lA, the State Allocation Board administered as many as 13 programs. 
The most current six are discussed above. With the enactment ofProposition IA, the 
number of programs has been reduced to two, along with a special category for hardship 
cases. This consolidation of programs makes it easier for school districts to choose a 
program that best suits their needs. It precludes the type of creative tactics that school 
districts were forced to pursue to match their projects to the right program in order for 
them to receive funding. 
A More Open Process 
The Proposition causes a major shift in policy direction for the State Allocation Board. 
Under its previous programs, the Board funded both new construction and modernization 
on a 50/50 matching basis. Under Proposition lA, the Board is required to fund 
modernization projects more generously than new construction projects, in that the State 
will fund 80 percent of the cost for modernization compared to 50 percent for new 
construction. 
Another major outcome of Proposition lA is that the State Allocation Board no longer 
has the authority to offer grants to school districts that may seek funds for special projects 
without any real statutory framework. Now school districts must demonstrate that they 
meet specific hardship criteria set out in the new law. The practical effect of this change 
will depend on how the Board interprets this provision. 
Previous legislation implicitly required that the State Allocation Board follow guidelines 
set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); however, the Board did not do so. 
Proposition lA explicitly requires the Board to follow AP A guidelines. This means that 
any change in policy or regulation considered by the Board must be properly noticed to 
the public before the Board can act. This requirement, if the Board follows the full spirit, 
will allow school districts to be fully informed of Board policies and procedures, as well as 
its rules and regulations. 
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PITFALLS IN THE PROCESS PRIOR TO PROPOSITION lA 
This section discusses the State Allocation Board's attempts to improve its system and the 
pitfalls that existed under the previous programs. 
Until recently, rules governing the application process were labor-intensive, both for 
school districts and the state agency personnel (including the Office ofPublic School 
Construction and the Division ofthe State Architect). In 1989, the Legislature received a 
report outlining the complex application.102 The report identified 54 steps school districts 
had to perform in order to receive application approval and eventual financing. In 
addition, the process required 24 separate forms. 
Process Streamlined Recently 
Since 1992, the OPSC has tried to be more efficient. Changes implemented by OPSC 
included: simplified and streamlined applications; improved response time for application 
review; improved policy information dissemination; and school districts were empowered 
to complete their own applications. 
The most concrete indication that the Office of Public School Construction was becoming 
more efficient was in the application process. The application process for the Growth 
Program was reduced from 54 steps to nine. In addition, the number of forms that were 
needed to apply for funding was reduced from 24 to four. 
School districts complained and begged for applications to be checked and approved for a 
State Allocation Board meeting agenda in an expeditious fashion. As part of the efficiency 
movement, the Office ofPublic School Construction set a goal to reduce the time from 
when a school district filed a completed application until it was placed on a State 
Allocation Board meeting agenda from over 400 days to 60 days. 103 Prior to Proposition 
I A, applications on average still took longer than the 60 days to be reviewed. However, 
the office's efficiency achievement by reducing application review days is noteworthy. 
In addition, the Office ofPublic School Construction worked more closely with school 
districts in the decision making process and provided greater leeway. In particular, school 
district personnel could self-certify certain information pertaining to a project rather than 
rely on state agency personnel. The self-certification process removed the time a school 
district would wait for a response from the Office ofPublic School Construction. It 
thereby shortened the application process. 
Under its previous programs, it was difficult for school districts to get information 
pertaining to the funding process from the Office of Local Assistance (OLA) staff or from 
written materials. The Office of Public School Construction is now more service-
oriented.104 One can obtain information in person or from the office's Internet site. 105 In 
fact, the staff of the Office of Public School Construction is continually placing more 
information on the Internet. This information includes an automated project tracking 
system, Senate Bill 50 regulations, office contacts, and old board policy changes. 
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School Districts in Line Stand on Shifting Sands 
Under the previous allocation system, school districts that completed their applications 
and were placed in queue were never guaranteed funding in the order their applications 
were received. The State Allocation Board dictated that school district applications were 
placed in an unfunded application list on a first-come/first-served basis. However, there 
were four general ways that school district applications could be "bumped" up or down in 
the queue. 
Broad Classification Decisions 
The first way a school district could get bumped was if the State Allocation Board decided 
to redirect its emphasis and fund a: broad e&tegory ofprojeets. For iQstat:K:e, the SAB 
could decide to fund all application projects from small school districts (no matter where 
they were in queue). If a school district was large, hundreds of proposed school projects 
could jump ahead in the funding queue. 
The second way a school district could get bumped was if the State Allocation Board 
shifted the specific funding program allocations. Thus, for example, the State Allocation 
Board could decide to shift funds earmarked for the Growth Program to the State 
Portable Classroom Program. 
Specific School District Decisions 
The third way a school district could get bumped was if another school district application 
in queue with a later application filing date appealed to the State Allocation Board to 
change its application filing date to be ahead of other school districts. That school district 
application would be funded first. 
The fourth way a school district could get bumped was if an emergency situation occurred 
and a school district requested critical hardship money from the State Allocation Board. 
The Board could provide these funds when available. 
The application process requires equity and balance in order to ensure fair competition by 
school districts for State funds. The process needs to be flexible enough to handle 
emergency situations, yet firm enough to prohibit jockeying among school districts for 
better placement in the queue. 
Proposition IA halts the movement of funds from one program to another. However, the 
other examples are still feasible. Jockeying of school districts by consultants for better 
placement in line may continue to occur. This is especially true as Proposition IA cannot 
handle the pent up demand for State funds. The next section discusses options that the 
Legislature may consider in order to improve this system. 
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OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SCHOOL FACILITY 
FINANCING SYSTEM 
A Separate List for Small and Rural School Districts 
When the Proposition lA funds are exhausted, new construction project applications will 
receive priority points for future funding. Small and rural school districts may require 
separate lists to ensure that they are placed near the front of a funding queue. This is 
necessary because there is no guarantee that the entire queue would receive fi1ture 
funding. Small and rural school districts, based on the current priority points system, may 
not receive enough priority points to approach the front ofthe queue. Larger school 
district applications, with greater per pupil need, may be able to position themselves high 
enough in the queue for funding by receiving favorable OPSC evaluations. Proposition 
lA allows schools to skip to higher positions in the funding queue if they score higher 
priority points based on their number of unhoused students or if they can demonstrate a 
special hardship. The Legislature may wish to create a separate list for small and rural 
school districts to create a more equitable system. 
Annual Report and Independent Accounting 
In the early 1990s, many state agencies, boards, and commissions, because of budget cuts, 
postponed writing annual reports to the Legislature. These reports provided financial and 
policy information to the public. The State Allocation Board was one government entity 
that has not prepared regular audited reports of its programs' operations and expenditures 
for public review. The State Allocation Board will receive $6.7 billion over the next four 
years to fund school construction projects. The Legislature may wish to require the 
Board to prepare for the Governor and Legislature an annual report that details how and 
to whom bond funds were distributed The Legislature may wish to require that an 
independent accounting firm or the State Auditor General prepare the Board's report. 
On-Line Technical Assistance 
Although the application and funding process administered by the Office of Public School 
Construction has been streamlined and simplified in recent years, certain components of 
the process are still cumbersome. The process should be simple enough that school 
districts do not need to hire consultants or lobbyists to advise them or to shepherd their 
proposals. The Legislature may wish to pass legislation that would require the OPSC to 
develop a technical assistance program to provide school districts with the necessary 
information and advice they need in order to qualify for and receive bond funds. Such a 
system could include an automated Internet help-fine. 
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A Special General Fund Appropriation for School Construction 
The State's bond capacity may not be able to fund every State infrastructure need, 
including schools, transportation, prisons, and water during the next decade. School 
facility needs are estimated conservatively at roughly $10 billion, while some estimates 
have put the figure at $40 billion for the next decade alone. According to the Department 
of Finance, the State can afford to service approximately $25 billion in additional debt. 
Thus, school facility financing alone could incur the entire debt capacity of the State. The 
Legislature may wish to create a special appropriation fund for public school capital 
(Jtttkty 61SJ*Nl ofthe State GeHeralF~:~nd tfJ augm«Rt th« State '5 bmulprogram5 Tn 
addition, the State may wish to design a school construction reserve fund, which is 
funded from budget surplus revenues. 
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APPENDIX A 
School District Financing Mechanisms 
In addition to state bond funds, school districts have a variety of other alternatives for 
funding school construction. These include developer fees, certificate of participation, 
general obligation bonds, and Mello-Roos taxes. Also, a developer may simply build a 
school rather than consider other financing alternatives. 
Local General Obligation Bonds 
In 1986, after an eight-year hiatus, school districts could once again use general obligation 
bonds to finance school facilities. Bonds are a favorable method of financing, eveP though 
they require a two-thirds vote and proceeds cannot be used for items such as buses and 
furnishings. In 1986, 14 school districts offered bond initiatives. In 1987 and 1988, this 
number grew to 51 and 54 school districts, respectively. In November 1998, 36 school 
districts held bond elections.106 
Developer Fees 
In 1978, the Wilsona School District was the first to use developer fees. These fees added 
about $2,000 to the cost of a typical home in the Lancaster area. While school districts 
were exacting developer fees, there was no statute that explicitly permitted this activity. 
The Legislature standardized the authority by giving school districts direct authority to 
charge developer fees. School districts welcomed developer fees especially because they 
did not require an election, and the funds associated with the fees could be used for a wide 
variety of facilities that were associated with enrollment growth. In response to a growing 
number of complaints from developers, the Legislature capped the amount that could be 
collected in 1986. Proposition 1A prohibited local agencies from using the inadequacy of 
school facilities as a reason for not approving housing development projects. The 
authority to raise developer fees was placed with the State Allocation Board. However, 
developer fees generally are not enough to cover the full costs of constructing a school. 
Certificates of Participation 
Certificates ofParticipation (COPs) are another, though complicated, tool for districts to 
raise money without voter consent. The most common arrangement is that the district 
leases a new school owned by another government agency or a nonprofit agency, which in 
turn raises the capital to build the school by selling shares (certificates of participation). In 
the long run, lien revenues COPs are remarkably like bonds. One disadvantage ofthe 
COP arrangement is that it does not provide a new revenue source for the lease payments. 
Funds usually come from the school district's general fund. 
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Mello-Roos 
The Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act, established in 1982, authorized school districts 
and local governments to form "community facilities districts." Subject to the approval of 
two-thirds of the voters, these special districts could sell bonds to raise revenues for the 
purpose of financing new buildings, or to rehabilitate existing school facilities. A majority 
ofMello-Roos districts are created in inhabitable areas that are proposed for development 
where voting is by the landowners. The district sets a specific tax per house. 
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